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f 44 C2d 147; 280 P.2d 7891 
the lessor from a loss of a of the income from 
i he lessee business if it ceased to occupy the It 
a reasonable implication from these provisions that the 
upon the same measure of damages when that 
loss resulted from an abandonment of the integral purpose 
which the lease was made. There was no error in the 
award of UUUWC"-C0. 
The is affirmed. 
C. ,J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
alHl Spence, .,T., eonenrred. 
A. No. 23133. Iu Bank. Mar. Hlilil.] 
Estate of JOSEPH C. POISh Deceased. EMMA POISL, 
Appellant, v. ROBI£Wr L. F'ERGUSON, as Executor, 
etc., et al., Hespondents. 
[1] Wills- Revocation- Marriage After Making WilL-General 
disinheritance clause in will does not constitute mention of 
subse<1uently acquired wife in such way as to show intention 
not to make provision for her within purview of Prob. Code, 
§ 70, declaring that will is revoked by subsequent marriage of 
testator unless spouse is provided for or mentioned in wilL 
[2] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making Will.-Merely nam-
or g1vmg to woman by name, with no indication 
that she may be prospective spouse, is insufficient to prevent 
revocation of will as to after-acquired spouse. 
[3] !d.-Revocation-Marriage After Making WilL-Contempla-
tion of future marriage must appear on face of will to prevent 
revocation of will as to after-acquired spouse, and extrinsic. 
evidence is not admissible to show testator's intention, at least 
unless there is some ambiguity. (Disapproving Estate of Ap-
penfelcler, 99 Cal.App. 330, 278 P. 473, and Estate of Brannon, 
111 CaLApp. 38, 295 P. 83.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County upholding validity of a wilL Newcomb 
Condee, J udgc. Reversed. 
[1] Marriage as revoking will, note, 92 A.L.R. 1010. See also 
Cal.Jur., Wills, § 151 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § il26 ct seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Wills, § 260. 
'rhomas 
69 
''Emmie'' also known as ''Emma 
Alhambra; the residue to the two 
Blackburn" in 
It also provided 
omitted 
Poisl died on .rune 16, 'rhe will was admitted to 
probate mHl letters issued. Emma Blackburn 
Poisl filed a to revoke the probate as to her, alleging 
that she and Poisl were married on 1951 ( n few days 
more than seven months after the will was executed and about 
eleven months prior to his and were husband and wife 
at the time of his death. 
the court without a jury. The 
court found the facts but that provision was made 
reason of the legacy to her by 
name to the and that hence the -vvill was not 
reYoked as io her under seetion 70 of the Pro batt~ Code.* 
From the cvidenee it appears that Emma had known Poisl 
and he had lived in her house ·when he was in the T~os Angeles 
arra; Emma Blackburn and testator's surviving widow are 
the person. The value of the of as 
the petition for probate of his will, was cash, 
the San Diego property devised to Emma, worth 
$20,000, and promissory notes for $20,051.87. No evidence 
was offered on the of whether Poisl contemplated 
Emma when he made his wilL 
[1] Applying seetion 70 of the Probate Code, .mpra, to 
the instant case, it is settled that the general disinheritance 
~~~'If a marries after mal<ing a will, and the survives 
the mnker, will is revoked as to the spouse, unless has ],een 
madp for the by contmet, or unless 
vidcd for in will, or in way mentioned therein as to show an 
intention not to make such provision; and no othm evidence to rebut the 
presumption of revocation can be received." (Pro b. Code, § 70.) 
Mar. 1955] 
spouse. Estate 
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not constitute a mention of Emma in 
intention not to make for 
23 Cal.2d 761 P.2d 1] .) 'l'he 
has been made 
clause 
volyed a clause in a in the 
in the Axcelrod case, that excluded all persons who may be-
come the testatrix' heirs "by reason of or other-
wise"; that was held sufficient disinheritance to revo-
cation as to an spouse. The of the 
Dnke ease is ·while the clause did not disinherit the spouse 
hy name, it sho1Yed a the executrix of a 
possibility of in the future, and the effect that mar-
riage \Vould have upon the will; that intent to mention a 
future spouse and to disinherit him. Thus the Duke ease is 
readily from the ease at bar that it 
does indicate that the will must show a contemplation of a 
fnture on the of the testator to with 
the fundamental purpose of section 70, whether we are 
ing of disin}JCritancc or the after ac-
quired sponsr. In Estate Duke, supra, 41 CaL2d 
we stated: ''And, although a testator need not make provision 
for snch a spouse, he is I'Pquired to bear in mind the 
bility of a marriage and the serious changes in 
(lomesiic relations therefrom. 'fhe Court 
of said of a similar statute: 'The object of the pro-
vision is to seenre a moral influence upon the testa-
mrntar.v aet-tho moral inftnenee of having in mind a con-
event so momentous as marriage ... , and so deserv-
ing of consideration in a testamentary scheme.' (Ellis 
v. Dnrden, 86 na. 372 [12 S.K 652, 653, 11 L.R.A. 511 : 
quoted Yrith in Estate S1tpra, p. 292.)" 
(See Estate 191 Cal. 307, 311 [216 P. 366]; Estate 
of snpra, 23 Cal.2d 761, 767-768; Corker v. Corker, 
87 Cal. 648 P. 922}; Estate Meyer, 44 Cal.App. 289, 
292-293 [1 8£1 P. 393].) [2] It being necessary for the testa-
150 EsTATE ov PorsL 
tor to have "in mind" a "momentous" oecasion such as mar-
riage, it follows that or to a 
person name, as was done in the ease at no 
indication that she may be a spouse, 
to prevent revocation. [3] 'l'hat i]](]ieation mnst appear 011 
the face of the will, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible, 
to show the testator's at least unlec;s there is some 
ambiguity. As in the Duke case a to named person 
alone, although the named person later married to the 
testator, creates no ; it is merely "noncommittal" 
as were the vwrds "heirs at las•;" in the Duke case. 
of Dnke, supra, 41 Cal.2d 509, 515.) 
There are cases in other with statutes similar 
. to ours holding that contemplation of a future mnst 
appear on the face of the will to prevent revocation 
cases collected 127 A.hR 750). In Estate , 
9fJ Cal.App. 330 [278 P. 473] also Estate of Brannou, 
111 Cal.App. 38 [295 P. 83]) a contrary view was taken bnt 
no consideration was given to the purpose aJH1 
policy of section 70 as indicated by the cases heretofor0 
cited. 'l'he last cited cases are, therefore, disapprowd. 
Defendants argue that the Appenfelder case having bern 
decided when the statutory provisions preceding section 70 
of the Probate Code were codified in that code, the Legislature 
knew thereof and thus approved the interpretation which did 
not require that a contemplation of marriage appear on tlw 
face of the will, and along the same line contend that tlw 
law in force-the rule in the Appenfelder ease-at the timr 
the testator made the ·will should be applied. Assuming bnt 
not deciding the correetness of the legal propositions inherent 
in those contentions, they can have no applieation here be-
cause the law of this state was not neeessarily as stated in the 
Appenfelder case. This is apparent because in other cases 
the reasoning in the Duke case had been applied. (Estate 
of 111eycr, 44 Cal.App. 289 [186 P. 393], quoting with approYal 
the discussion in Ellis v. Darden, 86 Ga. 368 [12 S.E. 652, 11 
hRA. 51], whieh in turn 1ms in the Duke case; 
Estate of Ryan, supra, 191 Cal. 307, 311; Corke1· Y. Corke1·, 
supra, 87 Cal. 643.) \Vhilc those cases dealt with the ques-
tion of disinheritance as distinguished from making provision 
for the after-aeq uired spouse, t hrre appears to be no reason 
why seetion 70 should be interpreted differently in the one 
situation than in the other. (::iee discussion 32 Cal.L.Rev. 
213.) The ~Washington cases (In re Steele's Estate, 45 vVn. 
Mar. BsTATE OP PorsL 
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In n· "1 dl rT's Esto.ft, ;)2 Wash. fi!39 
upon defendants, cannot be eon-
of the above discussed authorities 
is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, Edmonds, rrraynor, J., and 
concurred. 
J.-I dissent. 
Section 70 of the Probate Code is clear and unambiguous. 
It provides, in that a will executed before the marriage 
of a testator is not revoked by the marriage if "the spouse 
is provided for in the wilL'' Emma Blackburn, now Emma 
Blackburn Poisl, became the spouse of the testator after the 
execution of the will, but the will specifically devised and be-
queathed certain real and personal property to her. There-
fore she was ''provided for in the will,'' and the marriage 
did not effect a revocation. 
'l'hose courts ·which have construed provisions similar in 
material respects to section 70, have been unwilling to en-
graft additional requirements upon the clear and unambiguous 
language of their statutes, and therefore have held that it 
is sufficient that provision be made in a will for a spouse 
identified by her maiden name. Nothing need appear in the 
will indicating that at the time of its execution the testator 
contemplated his marriage to the named beneficiary. (In rc 
Steele's Estate, 45 \Vn.2d 58 [273 P.2d 235] ; In re Adler's 
Estate, 52 Wash. 539 [100 P. 1019] .) It was so held in a 
well-reasoned opinion in Estate of Appenfelder, 99 Cal.App. 
330 [278 P. 473], and the Legislature thereafter reenacted 
the former section when it adopted the Probate Code. 
The majority opinion wonld disapprove the Appenfelder 
(~ase by reasoning from a supposed analogy between the 
situation here and that presented in certain cases involving 
an entirely different provision of the section. (Estate of Duke, 
41 Cal.2d 509 [261 P.2d 235] ; Estate of Axcelrod, 23 Cal.2d 
761 [147 P.2d 1] .) The last-mentioned provision declares that 
the will is not revoked if the spouse is ''in such way mentioned 
therein as to show an intention not to make such provision.'' 
In other words, that portion of the section deals solely with 
the subject of intentional disinheritance; and the last cited 
cases deal with situations where the spouse was neither ''pro-
vided for" or "mentioned" by name in the will. There is 
1<'. Ko. 18963. 
EDW AHD P. 1\IcKBON, BEN L. GIUS'l'O, 
[la, Contracts- Modification- Oral Modification of Written 
Contract.-Civ. § 
may be altered 
agn'emPnt, presupposP~ and ac-
docs not inntlidate new oral after 
written contract has by its terms or has 
cancelled or rescinded. 
[2] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Termination. 
-\Vritten contract for of for one year 
for stnted salary plus percentage of profits of defendant's 
business terminates at end of year unless parties agree that 
it shall continue. 
l3] !d.-Contracts of Employment-Renewal of Agreement.-Fact 
that continues in defendant's after euJ of year 
in written contract of for one ycrrn· 
standing alone, that parties to continuation 
of written contract. Lab. Code, § 
[ 4] !d.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Evidence.-In 
nction to recover to be clue undPr terms of oral 
extension of writtPn contract of for one year 
prodding for stated sum when added to 
would Pqual 30 prr cent of net of ddt>ndant's 
evidencr that plaintiff continued in def(•ndant's em-
ploy after end of year in reliance on defPndant's promise that 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 181 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 1128. 
McK. Dig. References: 
§ 29; 
s 52; 
1\Iaster and ~ 6; 
[10] Master and Servant, §53. 
~ 278; 
~ 20(2); 
